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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The interpretation of the following Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is determinative of certain issues in this appeal: 
Rule 15 provides in pertinent part: 
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires. 
Rule 23 is set forth in the addendum at the end of this 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs are holders of preferred stock in defendant 
Insurance Investment Company ("II"). II holds most of the voting 
stock of the defendant Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company 
("Equitable"). These companies and their principal officers, 
R. Earl Ross ("Earl") and E. Roderick Ross ("Rod")f are all jointly 
referred to as the "Equitable defendants", and sometimes herein as 
"defendants". 
Plaintiff Leontine C. Pond ("Pond")f and later plaintiff 
Merle G. Hyer Company ("Hyer"), have sought to represent a class 
comprised of all holders of II preferred stock, except for Earl, 
Rod, and their relatives ("the Ross family"). The trial court 
declined to certify this plaintiff class. 
Thereafter, other members of this plaintiff class sought 
to intervene. Their petition to intervene was denied. They did 
not appeal that denial. Therefore, defendants1 statement on page 
38 of their Brief that Judge Sawaya did not abuse his discretion 
when he denied the motion to allow intervention of additional 
2 
preferred shareholders is not addressed herein, because it is 
immaterial. 
In their statement of the case, defendants emphasize on 
page 4 of their Brief that the facts forming the basis of their 
second motion for summary judgment were not disputed by contradictory 
evidence, and proceed to list those facts. 
However, those undisputed facts likewise do not contradict 
the facts set forth in the plaintiffs1 Brief. 
For ease of reference, some of the numbered facts found 
in the Statement of the Case in the plaintiffs' opening Brief are 
essentially duplicated here: 
1. Pond was issued her 500 shares of II preferred stock 
after the death of her husband, Stillman H. Pond, upon the cancellation 
of the certificates that had been issued to him when he purchased 
them during their marriage in the early 1940's. ROA at 3. 
2. In the early 1980!s, only members of the Ross family 
would purchase Equitable or II preferred stock, and then only for 
less than $5 per share. Deposition of Rod taken June 10, 1991 -
ROA at 759, 549 (Rod Depo) at 120-21. Deposition of Earl taken 
June 11, 1991 - ROA at 760, 549 (Earl Depo) at 67-71. 
3. As of October 31, 1986, the Ross family owned or 
controlled all or nearly all of the voting common stock of II and 
about 70% of the II preferred stock. ROA at 475-78. 
4. A threat to Earl and Rod's control of Equitable was 
finally eliminated by Equitable's secret purchase of all of the II 
common and preferred stock and Equitable stock held directly or 
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indirectly by defendants Galen Ross, Connie Ross, David Ross and 
Betsy Ross Rapps, the members of the Ross family who had been 
pushed from a position of control. ROA at 437, 476-78. 
5. This was paid in the form of cash and a new issue 
of Equitable preferred stock, with the latter likely to be redeemed 
over a period of about 10 years. ROA at 422-30. 
6. The 1988 Annual Statement reported that in the 
purchase of its own stock pursuant to the 1986 offer, and in the 
purchase from "a coalition," Equitable paid a total consideration 
of $6,809,596 for the equivalent of 300,609 of its own shares, or 
an average of $22.65 per share. As part of this purchase, Equitable 
bought over 40% (based on liquidation rights) of the outstanding 
II stock. Rod Depo, Exh. 1, 4th page, included in the Addendum hereto. 
7. That same 1988 Annual Statement reported that each 
share it held of II stock, both common and preferred, was equivalent 
to 3.717 shares of its own stock "(based on liquidation rights)." 
Id. Thus those same liquidation rights would result in an average 
value of over $84 per share of II stock, common or preferred. 
8. When equitable made that secret purchase of stock, 
including II preferred stock, from the said "coalition" of insiders, 
it made no comparable offer to purchase the II preferred stock 
held by the plaintiff class, which would have meant an additional 
investment of less than $1,730,000. ROA at 11, 43. 
9. Dividends have been declared or paid by II in only 
a very few years since the issuance of the preferred stock therein, 
and then only at the minimum rate, 6% of the $1 par value. II has 
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indicated that dividends have been paid to the preferred shareholders 
of II on four occasions, namely/ in 1954, 1981, 1983 and 1984, and 
seven times total. ROA 211-12, 500. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE PLAINTIFF CLASS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED UNDER 
RULE 23(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WHERE THE PROPOSED 
CLASS CONSISTS OF 105 HOLDERS OF PREFERRED STOCK HAVING CLAIMS 
BASED ON FACTS SUCH AS THE COMPANY FAILING TO PAY DIVIDENDS, AND 
CERTAIN INSIDERS SELLING ALL OF THEIR PREFERRED STOCK TO A CONTROLLED 
COMPANY AT A PRICE PER SHARE OVER 16 TIMES AS GREAT AS THE MEMBERS 
OF THE PROPOSED CLASS COULD OBTAIN. 
The class is numerous enough. 
Defendants have not referred the court to any case 
showing that a class size of 105 preferred shareholders fails to 
satisfy the first requirement of Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure that the class be so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impractical. Rather, they say that after solicitation, 
only 10 demonstrated any interest, a number which did not make 
joinder impractical. Defendants1 Brief at 15, 19-20. 
In response, many of the addresses on the records of II 
shareholders are incorrect. This is not surprising in view of how 
seldom II sends a dividend or any other communication to those 
shareholders. 
Over twenty envelopes were returned with no indication 
of the correct address. On a couple there was the additional 
note that the addressees were deceased. In nearly all cases there 
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has not been a follow-up to determine if the other addressees ever 
received the initial correspondence. ROA at 585. 
Some of the addressees have responded by stating that 
they sold their holdings. Others indicated they were relatives of 
the addresseesf now deceased, and they did not know where a certificate 
was or if the addressees still held the stock at the time of their 
death. Id. 
Only two preferred shareholders stated they had decided 
not to intervene. One holds 1,000 shares and is apparently the 
wife of Mark Jensen, a man who 
was a stockbroker at the time that Bennett 
Leasing attempted a hostile takeover of Equitable, 
and got wind of it through inside information, 
and went about to attempt to purchase as much 
stck as he possibly could from a lot of 
shareholders of Equitable Life & Casualty 
Company at as low a cost as he could so that 
he could, therefore, thereafter make a killing 
by selling said stock to Bennett Leasing. 
Rod Depo. at 67. 
In her case, it would appear that she would prefer to 
let others pay the costs and attorneys' fees of this litigation 
and then come forward to demand equal treatment. 
In the other case, an apparently retired couple mailed a 
letter (ROA at 592 and included in the Addendum hereto), and then 
decided they would just as soon hang onto their 175 shares. 
So the fact that relatively few applied to intervene 
does not prove a class action is unwarranted. If anything, it 
shows an additional need for certification of the class. 
The member's desire to join is not an element of typicality. 
Defendants have argued that the proposed class 
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representatives are not typical, because they have not shown that 
other members of the proposed class "feel aggrieved" or "had a 
complaint." Defendants1 Brief at 20-21. 
The cited case of White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 
(1971) found a lack of typicality because the plaintiff had not 
yet shown that other minority employees who had been discharged by 
defendant felt that they were discharged by reason of their race 
or color. 
Defendants' confusion evidently arose from the following 
sentence paraphrased in defendants1 Brief: "It seems apparent 
that a claim cannot be typical of the claims of a class if no 
other member of the class feels aggrieved." Id. at 415. 
However, the context of the case clearly shows that the 
ruling was not based merely on the lack of proof of a subjective 
desire for redress on the part of other members of the class. 
Rather, the court was concerned that no other member of the class, 
when asked, would know of evidence or otherwise feel that his 
discharge was not based on legitimate grounds. 
After the statement quoted above, the White opinion 
explained "we are of the opinion that [typicality] requires the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that other members of the class he purports 
to represent have suffered the same grievances of which he complains." 
Id. 
The case of Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 
(10th Cir. 1975) cited by defendants, which case also cited the 
White case, supports this interpretation/ 
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In the Taylor casef the plaintiff showed the existence 
of discriminatory employment practices by Safeway in the frozen 
food warehouse. He evidently could not find many others in the 
class, if any, that had suffered any legally cognizable damage as 
a result of such practices. 
In citing White, the Taylor opinion stated that the 
concern in White was whether there was in fact a class needing 
representation. Taylor indicated that the question was not whether 
every employee would have the same fact situation. That would be 
unnecessary for the maintenance of a class action. Rather, the 
question was whether anyone else had a legitimate claim. Unless 
that had to be shown, the trial court would unrealistically have 
"to compare the claims and defenses of the plaintiff with the 
hypothetical claims of a hypothetical class." 
Clearly the instant cases suffers no such infirmity. 
Every other member of the class suffered the same legally cognizable 
harm as the representative plaintiff, differing only in the amount, 
dependent upon the number of preferred shares owned. It is not 
a prerequisite to show that other members care about receiving the 
legal and equitable remedies to which they are entitled. 
Even if defendants1 interpretation is correct that the 
other members of the class must be desirous that their rights be 
pursued, this can be presumed under the facts of this case. 
II issued and sold its preferred stock over 45 years ago. Although 
holders if this stock were to be the first to receive dividends, 
they have received dividends only seven times, because in only 
8 
seven years have dividends been declared. Although the funds they 
provided have been successfully invested and the value of the 
company is very highf only the holders of common shares can and do 
benefit from that value. Although members of the plaintiff class 
were to share at least pro-rata in any dissolution or liquidation 
of the company, insiders holding about one-third of the ownership 
of the company, much in the form of preferred shares, have been 
able to receive essentially the liquidation value of their shares 
of the company, while others selling preferred stock must settle 
for less than one-sixteenth of that value. Under these facts, the 
class would clearly exist even if to exist the members had to 
desire enforcement of their rights. 
2. WHERE OVER ONE-THIRD (BASED ON LIQUIDATION RIGHTS) 
OF THE STOCK IN A HOLDING COMPANY IS PURCHASED BY THE COMPANY IT 
CONTROLS, THERE HAS BEEN "ANY LIQUIDATION" UNDER ITS 1944 AMENDED 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, ENTITLING ITS SHAREHOLDERS TO BE PAID IN 
THE MANNER PRESCRIBED THEREIN. 
"Any liquidation" does not mean only "complete liquidation". 
The Articles of Incorporation of II, as amended July 17, 
1944, stated in paragraph B. of Article VII: 
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution 
or winding up of this corporation, the holders 
of Preferred Stock shall be entitled to be 
paid in full the par value thereof before any 
amount shall be paid or any assets' distributed 
to the holders of Common Stock Class "A" and 
after the payment to the holders of Common 
Stock Class "A" of an amount equal to the par 
value of said Common Stock Class "A" the 
remaining assets of this corporation shall be 
divided and paid to the holders of Preferred 
Stock and the Holders of Common Stock Class 
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"A" according to the number of their respective 
shares. ROA at 9, 10, 42. [Emphasis added.] 
The defendants have argued that "liquidation" can refer 
only to a complete winding up of II's business, thus deleting the 
emphasized "any" and changing the emphasized "or" to "and." 
However, that definition of liquidation is much too narrow. 
As a matter of fact, the defendants in their Brief do 
not confine their use of the term liquidation to such a narrow 
meaning. On page 30 of that Brief, they state, "Donahue and the 
other cases cited by plaintiffs all relate to a preferential 
liquidation or minority shareholder 'freeze out,' ...." But each 
case cited referred to a situation, such as the instant matter, where 
those in control used corporate assets to buy a large block of 
stock from insiders without making a similar offer to all shareholders. 
Liquidation is the opposite of capitalization, and involves 
a return of capital. 
By "partial liquidations" we understand to be 
meant proceedings involving the surrender by 
the corporation of portions of its capital. 
Smith v. Dana, 60 A. 117, 123 (Conn. 1905). 
In the Smith case, the issue was whether a trust holding 
the corporation's stock should treat an extraordinary dividend as 
income or principal. This was also the issue in the case of In re 
Sears' Will, 26 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. Surr. 1941), wherein the dividends 
were ruled liquidating dividends and ordered distributed to the 
remaindermen of the trust. 
In the case of Jay Ronald Co. v. Marshall Mortgage Corp., 
40 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. 1943), the corporation had reduced its 
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capital by $200,000. The court ruled that the corporation had to 
distribute these funds to its stockholders. However, no interest 
was awarded. "We are of the opinion that the stockholders are not 
entitled thereto since a reduction of capital is in effect a 
voluntary liquidation of the retired capital .. . ." 3j3. at 399. 
In none of these cases did the corporation dissolve and 
wind up its business. And in each case the court did not define and 
refer to liquidation as requiring that finality or intent. 
3. A CONTROLLED COMPANY AND ITS OFFICERS AND SHAREHOLDERS 
ARE NOT INSULATED BY ARTIFICIALITIES FROM ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY TO 
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF ITS HOLDING COMPANY. 
Defendants argue that assuming plaintiffs would have a 
cause of action for actions of Equitable if they were shareholders 
of Equitable, their cause of action fails because they are only 
shareholders of II, a company which controls but is not identical 
to Equitable. 
It is true that the corporate legal fiction arising with 
the establishment of holding company is not always disregarded as 
a matter of course. But it is not true that this fiction forms 
an immutable wall against redress that is otherwise appropriate. 
The case of Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 
761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988) considered the responsibility of a 
parent corporation for the actions of a subsidiary, and reviewed 
Utah law pertaining to disregarding the corporate entity. 
In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the 
summary judgment dismissing the parent corporation in an action 
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against the subsidiary where it was alleged the parent owned 100% 
of the subsidiary's stock; the parent financed the subsidiary and 
paid some of its debts - without formal documentation and with no 
particular requirements for repayment; the subsidiary was 
undercapitalized; and the subsidiary's directors and officers did 
not act independently of the parent. Id^ . at 47. 
The ooinion in that case cited the case of Norman v. Murray 
First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979) and referred to 
the two-prong test adopted therein to determine when disregarding 
the corporate entity is justified. 
The opinion then referred to the fact that Messick 
v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 678 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1984) had 
called the first prong of this two-prong test found in Norman the 
"formalities requirement." The Messick opinion referred to the 
formalities required by statute, including record keeping, share-
holders' meetings, adequate capitalization, stock issuance, etc. 
Apparently the record has not yet been developed enough 
to show the complete picture as to the observation of formalities. 
However, the record does show that on or about March 21, 1989 a 
request was made for financial information of II, and the response 
lacked detail, consisting of two pages, a Balance Sheet and a 
Statement of Profit & Loss, copies of which are included in the 
Addendum hereto. ROA at 6, 15, 16, 38. 
The Salt Lake City ooinion stated: 
In the parent-subsidiary situation, the central 
focus of the formalities prong is "the degree 
of control that the parent exercises over the 
subsidiary and the extent to which the corporate 
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formalities of the subsidiary are observed." 
Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 Willamette 
L. Rev. at 397. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors , supra, 761 P.2d at 47. 
The opinion then referred with approval to the eleven 
factors listed on page 398 of the Willamette article relevant to 
deciding whether the parent exercises "the necessary control" over 
its subsidiary. Some of these eleven factors are as follows: 
(1) the parent corporation owns all or most 
of the capital stock of the subsidiary; 
(2) the parent and subsidiary corporations 
employ common directors or officers; 
(3) the parent corporation finances the 
subsidiary; 
(4) the parent corporation subscribes to all 
the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise 
causes its incorporation; 
(5) the subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital; 
(8) in the papers of the parent corporation 
or in the statement of its officers, the 
subsidiary is described as a department or 
division of the parent corporation, or its 
business or financial responsibility is referred 
to as the parent corporation's own; 
(9) the directors or executives of the subsidiary 
do not act independently in the interest of 
the subsidiary but take their orders from the 
parent corporation in the latter's interest; 
(11) the parent corporation uses the property 
of the subsidiary as its own. 
Usually, the parent-subsidiary relationship is devised 
to shield the assets of the parent from outside parties. However, 
in the instant case, the purpose is to try to keep the assets in 
the subsidiary further removed from the minority shareholders of 
the parent. Hence a number of the factors enumerated above, as 
well as those omitted, would be reversed, but still show the 
applicability of the instrumentality rule. 
For example as to the 8th factor, the subsidiary Equitable 
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shows its holdings of II stock, both common and preferredf as 
treasury stock, valuing them according to an II liquidation. Rod 
Depo, Exh. 1, 4th page, included in the Addendum hereto. 
Page 47 of the Salt Lake City opinion then referred to 
the second prong of the Norman test as the "fairness requirement," 
which, as indicated on page 794 of the Messick case, "is addressed 
to the conscience of the court." 
The defendants cite W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law 
of Private Corporations, (perm. ed. 1984) for support against 
ignoring any aspect of the separate corporate existence of II and 
Equitable. Defendants' Brief at 29. However, that reference also 
shows that the corporate veils of parents and subsidiaries can be 
pierced in a number of circumstances, based on instrumentality, 
alter ego, and agency, in the presence of bad faith, or some other 
improper conduct. Id.. Sec. 43 at 72 9. 
4. A CORPORATION IS NOT JUSTIFIED IN SECRETLY PURCHASING 
ALL OF CERTAIN INSIDERS' PREFERRED STOCK OF ITS HOLDING COMPANY, 
AT A PRICE PER SHARE OVER 16 TIMES AS GREAT AS THE PRICE THE OTHER 
HOLDERS OF THAT STOCK COULD OBTAIN FROM THE CORPORATION OR ANYONE 
ELSE, ESPECIALLY IN ORDER TO RESOLVE DISPUTES OVER A CORPORATION'S 
CONTROL, DESPITE THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE.. 
Equitable should have offered to buy plaintiffs' II preferred shares. 
Equitable should have offered to buy plaintiffs' II 
preferred shares at the same price and on the same terms as those 
applicable to its purchase of II preferred shares from the defendants 
Galen J. Ross, David E. Ross II, Betsy Ross Rapps, and Connie Ross. 
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Defendants argue that this would require Equitable to 
offer to buy out its own shareholders. Appellee's Brief at 30 
n. 8. However, Equitable already offered to buy out its own 
shareholders for $22.50 per share of Equitable, which was a fair 
price. Rod Depof Exh. 1, 4th pager included in the Addendum hereto. 
On page 30 of their Brief, defendants cite three cases as 
support for their statement that Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of 
New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975) does not represent 
the law in Utah. Actually, all three cases fail to mention Donahue 
or its principles: Lochhead v. Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406 (D. Utah 
1988) held that the minority shareholders had stated an individual 
cause of action rather than derivative when their holdings had been 
diluted; Nash v. Craigco, 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978) held that 
punitive damages were available where a person obtained an option 
for shares that were subsequently diluted; and In re Black, 787 F.2d 
503, 506 (10th Cir. 1986) ruled that an officer who embezzled 
corporate funds had breached his duty to the corporation rather 
than to an individual stockholder. 
On that same page 30, defendants state that Donahue 
represents a rule that has been soundly rejected. Actually, only 
a per se rule, one that would require a corporation to give all 
shareholders an equal opportunity to sell their stock in every 
case, has been rejected. And the cases cited by defendants, 
Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1264 (4th Cir. 1978) (which 
distinguished Donahue) and McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 
(10th Cir. 1969) (which predated Donahue), did not deal with the 
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purchase by a corporation of its own stock, but rather the sale of 
a controlling block of stock to an outsider. 
In reality, Donahue has withstood the test of timef though 
its principles have been "refined." Crowley v. Communications for 
Hospitals, 573 N.E.2d 996, 1001 (Mass. App. 1991). 
The Crowley case pointed out that the controlling group 
must be given an opportunity to "demonstrate a legitimate business 
purpose for its actions." Id.. However, the Crowley case did not 
need to decide the extent to which the refinement applied, because 
in that case, as in the instant matter: 
There is manifest unfairness to the excluded, 
nonconsenting minority interests for the majority, 
year after year, to appropriate to themselves 
substantially all of the net income of the 
enterprise, and such an operational policy, 
which deprives the company, and therefore its 
stockholders, of all opportunites for growth 
in net worth, serves no legitimate business 
purpose. Id. 
Defendants distinguish Donahue on the basis that control 
was not at issue in that case. However, control was the issue in 
the case of Comolli v. Comolli, 246 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978). 
In that case, two brothers, Louis and Mario, joined 
forces to oust the oldest brother, Felix, from his positions as 
president and general manager of their company. When Mario died, 
his widow Christine would not sell Mario's stock to Felix for $800 
per share, but she would sell it to the other brother Louis for 
that price. Louis bought 10 shares personally, and ran out of money. 
So he used his control to have the corporation buy the rest. Thus 
the corporate assets were used to prevent the risk of a sale of 
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stock to Felix and the accompanying change of control. 
The court stated that in Georgia directors have a duty 
to act in good faith and with ordinary diligence. This good faith 
does not just apply to the corporation, but "also requires that 
stockholders be treated fairly and that their investments be 
protected," ^d. at 280. 
The court pointed out that minority stockholders in 
close corporations may have relative insignificance and their 
investments be held captive. But this should not be aided or 
reinforced by the use of corporate funds. Ld. at 281. 
The action of the directors demonstrated a lack of good 
faith, since the funds used to purchase the shares from Christine 
were not then available for dividends. "[G]ood faith requirefd] the 
directors to authorize a corporate purchase of Felix1 stock at 
the same price and the same terms given to Christine," if there 
were to be any corporate purchase at all. Id. 
The court then cited Donahue, supra, and added that such 
a course of action would eliminate any question of a preferential 
distribution of assets and provide Felix with an opportunity to 
liquidate his investment. Id. 
The defendants cited the case of Delahoussaye^ v. Newhard, 
785 S.W.2d 609 (Mo, App. 1990) as a counter-example. However, 
that opinion distinguished the Donahue case on its facts, pointing 
out that in Donahue the directors who discriminated in their 
purchase of stock with corporate funds were a "controlling group," 
owning or controlling a majority of the stock issued and outstanding. 
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In Delahoussaye the directors who approved the stock purchase did 
not own or control a majority of the outstanding shares. 
At the time Equitable selectively purchased stock of its 
holding company, the named defendants controlled II and Equitable, 
Not only that, but the named defendants, excluding the selling 
defendants, controlled II and Equitable; although in view of the 
litigation, that control was tenuous. They had gained this control 
by means of the sale of some pivotal II stock from a charitable 
foundation to a person friendly to their position. Earl Depo at 12. 
Defendants are not excused by the business judgment rule. 
The defendants cite Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
493 A.2d 946 (Del. Supr. 1985) to show that their actions were 
justified by the business judgment rule. That case involved a 
decision by the directors, a majority of whom were outsiders. 
After hours of deliberations, some involving only the outside 
directors, the board unanimously agreed to offer to buy the company's 
stock from any stockholder except the party engaged in a hostile 
takeover attempt. Thus the business judgment rule and presumption 
described in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Supr. 1984) 
of action having been taken in good faith would apply. 
But even that presumption of adequate justification 
would be overcome upon a showing that the directors "acted out of 
a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office." 
Unocal, supra, 493 A.2d at 954. 
Not only can the presumption be overcome, but where a 
threat to control is involved, the burden shifts to the directors 
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to show that the purchase of stock is primarily in the corporate 
interest. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964). 
In the Cheff case, cited by defendants, the appellate 
court found that the directors carried that burden. The directors 
had adduced evidence showing that their motivation for the use of 
corporate assets to selectively purchase stock was a valid business 
purpose. To reach this result, the appellate court reversed two 
findings of fact, finding instead that all evidence demonstrated 
that there was a real threat the company would be liquidated and 
that this threat had caused employee unrest. 
In the instant matter, insiders and major stockholders 
controlled the decision. Control was clearly involved. Hence the 
burden to show a valid business purpose is on the defendants. 
They have shown no threat of liquidation. And it cannot otherwise 
be said that as a matter of law they have carried their burden to 
show that the primary purpose was a valid business purpose, rather 
than to maintain control. 
The defendants1 argument that control was not involved 
in purchasing II preferred stock is flawed. The purchase of II 
preferred stock enabled the purchase of II common stock, which involved 
control. Whether this control was threatened by Bennett Leasing 
or by other members of the Ross family is irrlevant. 
5. EVERY ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY OF THE 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF A CORPORATION NEED NOT BE BROUGHT AS A 
DERIVATIVE ACTION. 
Defendants argue that any claim against them belongs to 
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II or Equitable, and can therefore only be brought as a derivative 
action. Appellee's Brief at 34-35. 
This distinction was discussed in detail in the case of 
Crowley v. Communications for Hospitals, 573 N.E.2d 996 (Mass. 
App. 1991). That case stated: 
A finding of a "freeze-out" scheme may well be 
an element of a case for direct relief, but it 
is not necessarily sufficent to preclude the 
need for derivative relief. Id_. at 1004. 
Wording this another way, while facts such as excessive 
officer salaries may provide the basis for an action which is 
necessarily derivative, they can still also support elements of a 
case for direct relief on the basis of a "freeze-out" scheme. 
In footnotes, the Crowley opinion pointed out that the 
transaction complained of in the Donahue case was fair as between 
the corporation and the sellers of the stock. Thus that did not 
show a violation of fiduciary duty to the corporation and justify 
a recovery by the corporation. Id^ ., nn. 15-17. 
Likewise in the instant matter, the stock purchase 
was fair as to the corporation. But it served to further ensure 
that the minority stockholders would be frozen out. 
6. PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED AGAINST THE OFFICERS 
AND DIRECTORS FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY WHEN ONLY EQUITABLE 
RELIEF INVOLVING THE COMPANY, AND NO GENERAL OR COMPENSATORY 
DAMAGES FROM THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, IS SPECIFIED IN THE PRAYER. 
Equitable relief suffices. 
Defendants cite the case of Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain 
States Tel., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985) as if it overruled the case 
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of Nash v, Craiqcoy 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978). However the Atkin 
opinion did not address Nash because the situations were so different. 
In Nash only equitable relief was granted. Nevertheless 
punitive damages were awarded. "Whether a party gets relief in 
equity or as a substitute therefor gets money ought not make a 
difference." IA. at 777. 
In Atkin no equitable relief had been sought. The 
Supreme Court firSt vacated the award of monetary damages and then 
the award of punitive damages. The Nash case was never mentioned. 
The prayer need not be specific. 
Since plaintiffs will not prevail by default, they are 
not limited by the prayers of the complaints. Thus nominal damagesf 
general damages, compensatory damages, etc. may be awarded. 
The argument that such relief may be an afterthought or 
unexpected does not remove the possibility of its being granted. 
In a close corporation, however, a minority 
shareholder who merely receives an offer from 
a majority shareholder to sell stock at an 
inadequate price, but does not accept that 
offer, can still seek damages if_ the shareholder 
can prove that the offer was part of a plan to 
freeze the minority shareholder out of the 
corporation. Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 
3, 8 (1st Cir. 1986). 
7. PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINTS 
TO ADD A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT WHEN THE CASE 
WAS STILL IN THE DISCOVERY AND MOTION STAGE. 
Claims previously denied can be reiterated. 
Defendants state that plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Amended 
Complaint was denied after their other claims were all dismissed. 
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However, the Motion was filed well over a month before the trial 
court heard argument and decided to dismiss those other claims. 
ROA at 525, 593, 595. 
The fact that the Amended Complaint included all claims, 
and not just those based on oppressive conduct, did not justify 
the refusal to allow it. It could easily have been allowed subject 
to the decisions made with respect to claims in the original 
complaints. 
Disallowance of amendment could cause deprivation of claims. 
Although the overall standard of review applicable to 
this issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion, 
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), it would seem clear 
that this should resolve into a question of law as to whether the 
claims added in the proposed Amended Complaint (ROA at 529), and 
particularly those pertaining to oppressive conduct (ROA at 544), 
stated a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that when a party seeks to amend his pleading, "leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires." This needs to be more than 
just an ineffective platitude. 
The facts showing oppressive conduct are in large measure 
the facts supporting plaintiffs1 other claims. Thus plaintiffs 
must pursue the oppressive conduct claims in this action or be 
forever barred. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 
(Utah 1983). 
So if a cause of action has been stated for oppressive 
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conduct, and it is barred forever because it was not initially 
stated in the complaints (although the pertinent facts were pled), 
then form is certainly being exalted over substance. This is 
particularly true if no other cause of action has been stated 
based upon those facts and plaintiffs can obtain no relief whatsover. 
What the defendants have done to the outsiders who 
invested in II preferred stock, many of whom have held that stock 
over 45 years and are now widows and widowers, is shocking to the 
conscience. At least as shocking would be a ruling that the 
plaintiffs are barred forever based on a procedural matter such as 
this, that is, a delay in fully describing their cause of action 
until the motion and discovery stage. 
Claims exist on the basis of oppressive conduct. 
Shareholders have a statutory cause of action when the 
acts of the directors or those in control are oppressive. Utah 
Code Subsec. 16-10-92(a )(2 ) or, since 1992, 16-10a-1430(2)(b). 
Defendants have argued that they have done only what 
they had a right to do. For example, they cite Donahue for the 
proposition that they do not have to answer to the courts for 
their decisions as to dividends. Appellees1 Brief at 40-41. 
The excerpt from Donahue cited by the defendants is part 
of the material supporting the statement in that case that "the 
corporate form ... supplies an opportunity for the majority stock-
holders to oppress or disadvantage minority stockholders." Donahue 
v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 
(Mass. 1975). Donahue pointed out that, as a practical matter, it 
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is hard to prove a violation of fiduciary duty just because dividends 
are not declared. 
Again looking at factual matters individually, the 
defendants state that excessive officer salaries are only relevant 
to derivative actions. Appellees' Brief at 41. 
However, the plundering of a corporation by means of 
excessive salaries often constitutes "oppressive" conduct: 
Thus, an abuse of corporate position for 
private gain at the expense of the stockholders 
is "oppressive" conduct. Or the plundering of 
a "close" corporation by the siphoning off of 
profits by excessive salaries or bonus payments 
and the operation of the business for the sole 
benefit of the majority of the stockholders, 
to the deteriment of the minority stockholders, 
would constitute such "oppressive" conduct as 
to authorize a dissolution of the corporation 
under the terms of ORS 57.595. Baker v. Commercial 
Body Builders, Inc., 264 Ore. 614, 507 P.2d 
387, 394 (1973). 
Generally, oppressive conduct involves a pattern of 
activities which are markedly unfair, violate the fiduciary 
responsibility of the majority shareholders, or thwart the reasonable 
expectations of the minority shareholders: 
Oppressive conduct suggests "burdensome, harsh 
and wrongful conduct, a lack of probity and 
fair dealing in the affairs of a company to 
the prejudice of some of its members, or a 
visible departure from the standards of fair 
dealings and a violation of fair play on which 
every shareholder who entrusts his money to a 
company is entitled to rely." Whale Art Co., 
Inc. v. Doctor, 743 S.W.2d 511, 514 
(Mo. App. 1987). 
Thus, we conclude that our cases involving 
the fiduciary duty owed by majority shareholders, 
officers and directors of a corporation embrace 
the same standard which other courts have 
evolved under the term "oppressive conduct." 
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Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440 
(W.Va. 1980). 
The [New York] court stated that "oppression 
should be deemed to arise only when the majority 
conduct substantially defeats expectations 
that, objectively viewed, were both reasonable 
under the circumstances and were central to 
the petitioner's decision to join the venture," 
Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387 
(N.D. 1987). 
The case of Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P. 2d 929 
(Mont. 1982) reviewed these definitions and applied them to show 
oppression where dividends had not been declared: 
It can be said here that the corporations 
are in a position to declare dividends, that 
the refusal to do so acts as a hardship on 
Melvin, and when considered in light of all 
other circumstances, that such refusal strengthens 
Melvin's argument that he is being squeezed. 
This is a case where the cumulative effects 
of many acts and incidents constitute sufficient 
evidence of oppressive conduct to compel 
liquidation without a showing of inevitable 
ruin. Jd. at 934. 
Although dissolution was found to be the appropriate 
remedy in the Fox case, a "buy-out" has often been found to be the 
appropriate remedy for oppressive conduct, even in the absence of 
express statutory or contractual authority. See Davis v. Sheerin, 
754 S.W.2d 375, 379 (Tex. App. 1988) and the cases cited therein. 
In the instant matter, obviously there has been the 
financial ability to pay dividends. It can hardly be said, and 
certainly not as a matter of law, that outsiders reasonably would 
have been purchased II preferred stock over 45 years ago at $1 per 
share with the expectation that despite a successful and robust 
venture, they would be limited to receiving $.06 seven times over 
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that period, and have nothing for retirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should have certified the plaintiff 
class under Rule 23(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedurer since 
the class was numerous enough and no subjective desire is necessary. 
The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that 
there was not "any liquidation" as that term was used in the 
Amended Articles of Incorporationf and thus that there was no 
requirement to evenly allocate the funds paid to the II shareholders. 
The existence of a holding company does not shield the 
wrongful conduct of the common directors. Those directors cannot 
cause the subsidiary to expend a huge amount of corporate assets to 
buy out only certain holders of the parent's stock where their 
purpose was to maintain control. 
Where there has been discrimination against certain 
shareholdersf these shareholders have a cause of action which is 
not just derivative. They also have a cause of action for punitive 
damages against all involved in a breach of fiduciary duty even 
though their main remedy sought may be equitable. 
The shareholders had a right to amend their complaint by 
adding a cause based on oppressive conduct, since they did indeed 
state a cause of action on that basis. 
DATED this Z C ~ day of ^7^-^^ _, 1993. 
LYNN P. HEWARD & DELWIN T. POND 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
LYNN P. HEWARD 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief 
were mailed with postage attached thereon to P. Bruce Badger, 215 
South State Street #1200, P.O. Box 510210, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84151 on this 2 6 ~ day of /"//u^,^. 1993. 
ADDENDUM 
Rule 23 provides: 
(a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a 
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all 
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class. 
(b) Class action maintainable. An action may be maintained as 
a class action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, 
and in addition: 
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the class would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect 
to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible 
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of 
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the 
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or 
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interests; or 
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to 
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making 
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
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(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the 
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in 
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the 
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating 
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the 
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class 
action. 
(c) Determination by order whether class action to be maintained; 
notice; judgment; actions conducted partially as class actions. 
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an 
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order 
whether it is to be maintained. An order under this subdivision 
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision 
on the merits. 
(2) In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), 
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice 
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The 
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude 
him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the 
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judgmentr whether favorable or notr will include all members who 
do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request 
exclusion mayf if he desires, enter an appearance through his 
counsel. 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action 
under Subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to 
the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds 
to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained 
as a class action under Subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable 
to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom 
the notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who 
have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be 
members of the class. 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained 
as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class 
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a 
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and 
applied accordingly. 
A. The Company is controlled by Insurance Investment Company, a uian corper«n*mg -. . .-. . . . . 
Investment has two classes of stock. There are 25,000 shares, voting stock and 77,177.5 shares of ft noncumulative, nonvoting, $1.00 par value of preferred stock, femersnip 
and control of this voting stock i s described in Schedule Y, Organizational Chart. 
6. The Company owns 11.502.23 voting-shares and 25,050 preferred shares of Insurance Investment Corporation. 
C. During 1986, the Board of Directors of Equitable l i f e and Casualty Insurance Company (hereafter the "Company") determined that i t would be in i t s best interest 
to purchase some of the Company's outstanding common stock and the common and preferred stock of Insurance Investment Company, the Company's parent corporation. The 
Utah Department of Insurance was notif ied of this intent and gave i t s consent to the same where necessary. The stock purchase program would sat isfy any or al l of the following 
purposes: 
(1) lo create a market for stockholders desiring to se l l their stock of the Company who have been unable to do so in the past because of lack of marketability. 
(2) To reduce the cost of communication to stockholders. 
(3) To make shares of the Company and Insurance Investment Company available for employee benefit programs. 
(4) To make shares of the Company and Insurance Investment Company available for use in the acquisition of other companies. 
(5) To increase the percentage of ownership of Insurance Investment Company in the Company. Such an increase would permit Insurance Investment Company to qualify 
for the 100 percent dividend exclusion for federal income tax purposes and/or ent i t l e Insurance Investment Company to f i l e a consolidated return with the Company. 
(6) To eliminate the Company's appearance as a potential candidate for an outside takeover. The Company's publicly held stock gave the appearance to uninformed 
individuals that i t was possible to purchase control of the Company by offering to purchase the Company's publicly held stock. Although i t was believed that such 
attempts were fu t i l e , such attempts were nevertheless being made, and were extremely disruptive and detrimental to the operation of the Company. 
On November 17, 1966, the Company ini t iated the above purchase plan by so l ic i t ing from i t s shareholders offers to sel l to the Company up to 115,500 shares of i t s outstanding 
$1.00 par value common shares for $22.50 per share. The Company acquired 95.662.43 common shares under the sol ic i tat ion and subsequent purchases for an aggregate cash 
consideration of $2,152,404. 
On October 31, 1967, the Company entered into an agreement with a coa.lition of some of i t s remaining shareholders wherein the Company agreed to purchase 44,544.37 shares of 
i t s common stock, 25,050.66 preferred shares of Insurance Investment Company, 11,602.23 common shares of Insurance Investment Company and 9.793.10 common shares of National Housing, 
related corporation, for $1,450,000 cash and the issuance of 363,000 shares of the Company's newly authorized $2.00 par value preferred stock. The Company was required to purchase 
a l l of this various stock in order to purchase any of i t . 
Effective April 15, 1966, National Mousing was merged into the Company. As a result of the merger, the Company acquired 7,366.65 shares of i t s common stock, 4,315 preferred 
share* of Insurance Investment Company and $662,095 in net asse ts , based upon their appraised fair value. In consideration for which, the Company paid $150,000 cash and issued 
40,000 shares of the Company's preferred stock. 
The total consideration paid by the Company under the above acquisitions is comprised of $3,752,404 cash and 403,000 shares of $2.00 par value preferred stock with an assigned 
cost of $9,229 ptr share (the einimum redemption price) . Since $662,095 of nonstock assets were received in tht lUtional Housing Ntrger, the total assigned cost for the treasury 
stock acquired is $6,609,596 ($3,752,404 cash • $3,719,267 (assigned value of preferred stock) — $662,095 (net value of nonstock assets acquired)). The aggregate consideration 
of $6,609,596 has beer, assigned to the cost of common treasury stock attributable to the above transaction for financial reporting purposes. During 1966. the Company redeemed 
36,603.35 shares of i t s preferred stock at an avenge cost of $10.71 per share. 
Tht owners of the preferred stock may, in the future, i f the Company has sufficient earnings in tht prior year, cause tht Company to purchase up to 40.300 shares per year at a 
price of $10.72 per share plus (or minus) a percentage of earnings (or losses) presented on line 31 of the Company's Annual Statement. Although the Company does not know whether 
or not this right will be exercised, tht Company will record a l i ab i l i t y as a write—in iten appearing or. page 3 of i t s Annutl Statement identifying i t s potential l i ab i l i ty for the 
subsequent ytar's purchast. This procedure of recording this l i ab i l i ty his been reviewed and approved by tht Utah Department of Usuranct. 
Tht Company's holding of treasury shares consists of 147.573.06 shares of i t s common stock which are owned directly by the Company and 153,036.26 shares which are held 
indirectly through tht Company's 40.3 percent holding (41,167.69 shares) of i t s parent company's capital shares (based on liquidation r ights . Doth the directly and indirectly 
held shares are d*f-n*4 to be treasury stock by tht Company for financial reporting purposes. The Company is holding such shares as treasury stock to satisfy the previously mentioned 
purposes. 
Tht Cocpany has received accounting assistance fron Feat Karwick Kain a\ Co. and legal assistance Iron Fabian I Clendenin in recording these transactions. 
D. Tht Company has no guaranties or undertakings for tht benefit of an a f f i l ia te which might result in a material contingent exposure of the Company's or aff i l iated insurer's 
assets to l i a b i l i t y . 
E. The Company does not have any management or service contracts of insuring arrangements with any aff i l iated insurer. 
ERA£D C0HPEKSAT10K AhD RnjfcEXEKT PLANS 
A. The Company has an employee profit sharing plan and a Section 403(k) plan for the employees. The Company has no retirement plan for i t s agents. The Company's Board of 
Directors determines annually the amount of contributions, i f any, tht Company will make to tht profit sharing plan. Contributions to the S40i(k) plan are made solely by employee 
elected contributions. Each of tht plans are fully funded. The Company has no l i a b i l i t y for benefits under either of the retirer.«ent plans. 
R i c h f i e l d , Utah 
J u l y 2 9 , 1991 
Lynn P . Heward 
928 HjflSt 5375 So . //E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8)|.117 
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INSURANCE INVESTMENT COMPANY 
BALANCE SHEET 
December 31, 1988 
ASSETS: 
Checking 
Savings Accounts 
Stock 
LIABILITIES; 
Notes Payable 
EQUITY; 
Common Stock 
Preferred Stock 
Paid in Surplus 
Earned Surplus 2,934.68 
1988 Operations (1,335.37) 
(4 
1,403 
144,334 
145,733 
1,777 
25,000 
77,177 
40,179 
1,599 
145,7 
INSURANCE INVESTMENT COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF PROFIT & LOSS 
YEAR - 1988 
INCOME: 
Interest Income 
Tax refund (State) 
Tax refund (Federal) 
EXPENSES: 
State Corporation Fees 15.00 
Income Tax (State) 100.00 
Banking Expense 29.27 
C.P.A. Expense 989.63 
Interest Expense 465.00 
1,598.90 
132. 
28, 
103. 
.53 
.00 
.00 
263.53 
